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ORDNANCE SUPPLY PROBLEMS IN THE CANADAS: 
THE QUEST FOR AN 
IMPROVED MILITARY TRANSPORT SYSTEM, 1814-1828 
Robert W. Passfield* 
(Received 25 September 1981, Revised/Accepted 24 October 
1981.) 
During the War of 1812, the greatest difficulty with which the British Army had to contend was the inadequacy of the Saint Lawrence River transport system, the sole artery by which troops, ordnance and supplies could be moved to Upper Canada from the ocean ports of Québec and Montréal in Lower Canada. The difficulties and delays experienced in forward­ing up the Saint Lawrence the large quantities of supplies and heavy ordnance needed to support the British forces in Upper Canada had not only hamstrung military operations in that theatre but, by 1814, threatened to render them impos­sible as the ever-increasing demands being placed on the transport system strained its shipping capacity and man­power to the breaking point. In response to these difficul­ties , the Ordnance Department began to search for ways in which the system of transport might be improved to make it less laborious, time consuming and costly; but this effort was barely underway when it was learned that the cutting of the highly-vulnerable Saint Lawrence communication was to be the primary objective of the American campaign of 1815. Although the termination of the war early in that year res­cued the Ordnance Department from an increasingly-hopeless situation, it did little to relieve the anxieties which had been raised about the security of Upper Canada in view of the vulnerability and inadequacies of the Saint Lawrence transport system. Thus, the close of the war witnessed the commencement of over a decade-long quest to develop a safe, interior line of communications independent of the Saint Lawrence by which troops, ordnance and supplies might be moved to Upper Canada. During the course of that effort, the cost, feasibility and potential utility of a number of alternative media and modes of transport were assessed to determine which would be best able to overcome the military transport problems encountered in the late war. In the following paper, the on-going process by which the practic­ability of various alternative technologies of transport were assessed has been reconstructed in the context of the transport problems faced by the military in the Canadas during the War of 1812, in order to determine to what extent the then-existing state of Canadian transport technology and the Upper Canadian environment influenced the decisions of the British Ordnance Department.1 
* Parks Canada 
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In meeting military transport needs in the Canadas prior to 
the War of 1812, the Ordnance Department had simply made 
use of the existing mode of transport on the Saint Lawrence 
where bateaux were employed on the navigable stretches of 
the river and ox carts and wagons were hired to haul cargoes 
over the portages at the rapids. The French-Canadian 
bateau adopted by the military was basically a flat-bottoired 
skiff with pointed ends and almost perpendicular sides. It 
measured forty feet long by six feet wide, and was capable 
of carrying five tons of cargo with a draught of only 
twenty inches.2 Each bateau was equipped with oars, setting 
poles, and a single square sail by which the crew of four 
and a tillerman worked it across the lakes and upstream 
against the strong currents of the Saint Lawrence River. 
The bateau had proved ideally suited to a turbulent river 
navigation as it was almost impossible to capsize,3 and had 
the shallow draught characteristic of the canoe while being 
able to withstand the hard knocks received in being worked 
up through rock-strewn rapids.^ 
On the Saint Lawrence transport system, all of the heavy 
freight going up river had to be carted overland eight miles 
from Montréal to Lachine to avoid the Lachine Rapids. The 
bateaux were loaded at Lachine from where they were capable 
of passing by wa ter all of the way to Kingston on Lake 
Ontario. However, this was no easy task. On the upper 
Saint Lawrence there were three relatively long, quiet 
stretches of water where the bateaux could proceed by oar 
or sail; but these were separated by two approximately 
nine-mile-long stretches of rapids where the river narrowed 
appreciably and the water ran so fast and furiously that 
the bateaux, despite having a sufficient depth of water to 
ascend, were unable to make any headway. At the base of 
each series of rapids the cargoes had to be transhipped by 
ox carts while the lightened bateaux were slowly and la­
boriously worked upwards with setting poles and, on occasion, 
by the crewmen plunging into water up to their armpits to 
pull on tow ropes. This work was relieved only by the em­
ployment of oxen to tow the bateaux where a sufficient 
depth of water was found close enough to shore to permit 
their employment. Once clear of the upper rapids, the 
bateaux were fully loaded to sail the last sixty-seven miles 
to Kingston where they would arrive anywhere from eleven to 
fourteen days after leaving Lachine, some 120 miles down­
stream. 5 on the return voyage, the bateaux were able to 
shoot the rapids reaching Lachine in three to four days.6 
The Saint Lawrence transport system had functioned reason­
ably well in the pre-war period; but with the coming of 
war, unprecedented heavy transport demands were made which 
altered the situation dramatically. In wartime, all of the 
ordnance, munitions, equipment and rations required to main­
tain an army in Upper Canada had to be imported and conveyed 
up the Saint Lawrence by bateaux. Upper Canada was but 
thinly populated, with the bulk of its population living by 
a subsistence agriculture which was unable to provide much 
of a food surplus at any time, and with the militia called 
out on active duty, there was no possibility of supporting 
the army on local resources as was the case where armies 
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were deployed in older more settled areas.8 Moreover, as of 1813, the American and British forces fighting on the Upper Canadian frontiers had commenced a shipbuilding war for naval supremacy on Lake Ontario which required the Ordnance Department to convey up the Saint Lawrence all tjie heavy long guns, anchors and ship cables required to equip the warships of up to 100 guns that the Royal Navy was con­structing at the Kingston dockyard.9 
Both the Americans and the British experienced severe trans­port problems in maintaining their respective armies on the frontiers of Upper Canada, so much so that logistics had determined the course of the struggle. As the war pro­gressed, both sides came to recognize the critical impor­tance of logistics, and the shipbuilding race for naval supremacy on Lake Ontario was but a natural response to this factor in an area where through roads were either non­existent or incapable of transporting heavy ordnance and stores.^-0 Where logistics were concerned, the British forces were at a decided disadvantage. Not only did all of their regular troops, ordnance and supplies have to be im­ported from England by way of the torturously slow, dif­ficult and costly Saint Lawrence communication, but that supply line — and its Lake Ontario extension — lay ex­posed along the whole of the fighting front as opposed to the American supply lines which ran back into the interior. ^  
Faced with increasingly-heavy transport demands on the Saint Lawrence, the Ordnance Department had responded by increasing the capacity of the existing system. The pre­war bateaux establishment of twenty-five vessels was in­creased to the point where, at the height of the war, 200 bateaux a week were proceeding up river, and farmers with their ox carts were being called out on corvée from as far as thirty miles distance from Lachine to man the portages. In 1814, 10,000 men were employed in the transport system, including 3,500 bateauxmen,12 and the Ordnance Department had to expend £341,215 to keep the system in operation, roughly triple the cost of the system in the first year of the war.13 Despite such enormous expenditures, manpower shortages developed in 1814 which made it clear that the capacity of the existing system could not be increased fur­ther or even sustained at its 1814 level.14 Consequently, plans were formed to render the transport system more ef­ficient by removing rocks that obstructed the water passage in the rapids close to shore, constructing a shallow bateaux canal between Montréal and Lachine, and employing Durham boats, which had a greater carrying capacity than bateaux, on the long stretches of open water between the rapids of the Saint Lawrence.15 But when it was learned that the Americans planned to cut the Saint Lawrence com­munication, the British military authorities immediately began to search for ways in which an alternative supply route to Upper Canada might be developed independent of the Saint Lawrence. The first proposal considered came from Lieut.-Col. Macdonnel, a Canadian serving with the British Army on the Saint Lawrence front. 
In November 1814, Macdonnel had proposed that an alternative 
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water communication might be opened by linking together a 
number of rivers and small lakes on the Lake Ontario water­
shed to the rear of Kingston, with waters flowing into the 
Rideau River on the Ottawa River watershed so that bateaux, 
if they ascended the existing Ottawa River navigation to 
the rear of Montréal, could pass through the interior of-
Upper Canada to Kingston independent of the Saint 
Lawrence.1 Only a handful of settlers was scattered 
throughout this vast wilderness area about which compara­
tively little was known; but Macdonnel, after reconnoitering 
the proposed route in December 1814, reported that a 
bateaux navigation could be developed by connecting up the 
headwaters of the Rideau and Cataraqui rivers. What 
Macdonnel had in mind was the improvement of the natural 
river navigations in conjunction with haulover portages to 
connect up the separate bodies of navigable water. These 
works, he believed, could readily be constructed at a mini­
mal cost to make a workable bateaux communication;1' but 
not everyone agreed that a bateaux communication so formed 
would prove all that viable. 
After perusing the Macdonnel plan in January 1815, Robert 
Nichol, the Quartermaster-General of Militia, noted that the 
great number and extent of the portages to be traversed 
would result in intolerable delays and require the employ-. 
ment of such a large and costly working establishment as 
would prove impossible to sustain in a wilderness. He cal­
culated that the ten portages alone would take eleven days 
to traverse, exclusive of the time spent on the river navi­
gations between the portages. Furthermore, Nichol felt that 
if the proposed Rideau navigation were to meet wartime 
transport demands, it would have to be capable of passing 
up to sixteen bateaux a day with their lading across each 
of its portages, and this would require an establishment 
of as many as 1700 yoke of oxen to make the system work 
effectively. Such a large establishment would be difficult 
to procure, even if money were no object; but what rendered 
the whole system totally impracticable in Nichol1 s judgment 
was the lack of forage for draught animals in the heavily-
forested Rideau interior.1J* Despite Nichol's objections, 
the local military authorities faced with the almost hope­
less task of keeping the Saint Lawrence open during the 
coming 1815 campaign were planning to proceed with the 
development of the proposed Rideau bateaux navigation when 
news arrived that a peace treaty had been signed.1 
The termination of the war, although it removed the serious 
logistical problems facing the Ordnance Department and 
saved the British forces from the prospect of having to 
abandon Upper Canada to fall back on a defence of the Saint 
Lawrence frontier, did not result in the shelving of the 
proposed Rideau communication. On the contrary, the 
Colonial Office, as well as the local British military com­
manders, was convinced that the security of the Canadas in 
any future war with the United States was dependent, in 
large measure, upon what steps were taken beforehand to 
develop and improve water communication with Upper Canada 
independent of the Saint Lawrence. Lord Bathurst, the 
Colonial Secretary, was particularly anxious that detailed 
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plans and estimates be prepared for the proposed Ottawa-Rideau bateaux navigation, as well as for a canal from Montreal to Lachine, so that the British government could determine whether the works should proceed separately or simultaneously.2 In the interim, discharged soldiers and their families were settled in the wilderness interior of the Rideau at Perth (after 1816), Richmond (after 1818) and Lanark (after 1820), to serve as nuclei for new settlements which would supply the labour, forage, and draught animals required to construct and operate a bateaux navigation, as well as provide trained militia units for its defence. It was hoped that the military settlements would foster an in­creasing trade which eventually would encourage the provin­cial government to undertake, or at least contribute sub­stantially towards, the cost of constructing a proper canal through the Rideau interior.21 The settlers were also en­couraged to open roads through the forest to connect the new military settlements with the major water communica­tions of the Ottawa River to the east and with Lake Ontario to the southwest at Kingston.22 The construction of roads by settlers in Upper Canada, however, was never regarded as a viable alternative to the construction of a canal, and with good reason. 
In the early period of settlement in Upper Canada, roads were not used extensively for transport outside of the win­ter months and, indeed, there was not much demand for heavy transport communications where subsistence farming was the norm and local communities were largely self sufficient. When heavy transport was needed, farmers either resorted to water carriage where that was available or waited until the winter months to do their heavy hauling by sleigh or sled. In winter, a snow-covered road, regardless of its summer condition, provided an excellent highway along which farmers could haul their crops to mill at any distance. In such circumstances, the farmers had little interest in improving roads when all that was necessary to effect a winter road was to clear a right-of-way through the trees.23 The so-called roads opened by the settlers in the Rideau corridor were, in effect, either mere bridle and bush paths, or roads which, although wide enough for a wagon, were cluttered with stumps, rocks and bogs that rendered them impassable for weeks on end during wet seasons of the year.2^ With the general lack of ditches,25 and the high trees excluding the wind, these forest roads were seldom dry.26 Corduroy roads were being constructed in the older, settled areas of the province at this time; but they provided at best a torturously slow and rough passage for horse and wagon, and such roads quickly broke up under heavy use.27 
Even if good roads could have been constructed, it was well known that heavy goods could be transported by water at one-twenty-fifth the cost of land carriage;28 and regardless of cost, there was no prospect of securing sufficient carts and wagons to meet military transport needs on a 125-mile-long road through the, as yet, sparcely-settled Rideau in­terior. In view of the total impracticability of the land transport alternative, the Ordnance Department concentrated 
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its efforts in the immediate post-war period on determining 
how the Ottawa and Rideau waterways might be temporarily 
improved to enable fully-laden bateaux to ascend the various 
rapids with little, if any, recourse to extensive land car­
riage with all of the problems that would entail until such 
time as a proper canal could be built. At the same time, 
plans were prepared for the construction of a Durham boat 
canal, sixteen feet wide by three feet deep, between 
Montréal and.Lachine, to eliminate the need for land trans­
port there.2 
As of 1817, Durham boats were in widespread use as freight 
carriers on the upper reaches of major North American river 
navigations.30 These boats were essentially narrow, nearly 
flat-bottomed barges sixty feet long and from eight to 
eleven feet wide with a rounded bow and stern, and an open 
hatch that extended well over half of the length and almost 
the full width. Fully loaded, a Durham boat was capable of 
carrying up to twenty-six tons with a draught of only 
twenty-eight inches;31 but on the upper Saint Lawrence, 
where they were first introduced by New York forwarders in 
1809, cargoes rarely exceeded eight tons in ascending the 
river.32 Each boat had a crew of five, and was propelled 
by a single sail or oars on quiet water and by poling when 
going upstream against a strong current. As with the 
bateaux, poling was extremely slow and laborious work in 
the rapids of the upper Saint Lawrence where the Durham 
boats also had to tranship their cargoes into land car­
riage.33 After the war, Durham boats began to supersede 
the bateaux as the preferred mode of downstream transport 
for heavy bulk freight as they not only possessed the shal­
low draught characteristic of the bateaux, but had better 
sailing qualities on open water and five times the tonnage 
capacity of a bateaux going downstream.34 The Ordnance De­
partment realized the advantages to be gained by employing 
Durham boats on canals, but still considered the bateaux to 
be the best mode of conveyance on river navigations where 
extensive rapids would have to be surmounted, hence the 
post-war decision to develop a temporary bateaux navigation 
through the Ottawa and Rideau waterways, while planning to 
construct a Durham boat canal from Montréal to Lachine.35 
It was assumed that Durham boat canals would eventually be 
constructed around the rapids of the Ottawa and Rideau 
waterways to complete an uninterrupted canal system from 
Montréal to Kingston.3*> To that end, in 1819, the military 
commenced the construction of a short bateaux canal at 
Grenville to pass the one set of rapids on the Ottawa river 
navigation that could not be improved sufficiently to enable 
fully-laden bateaux to ascend,3' and efforts continued to 
persuade the government of Lower Canada to construct a 
Durham boat canal to Lachine.38 When Lower Canada was about 
to undertake such a canal, however, the Admiralty insisted 
that it be constructed on a larger scale than envisaged by 
the Ordnance Department. 
As early as 1816, the British Admiralty had recommended 
that the proposed Lachine Canal should be large enough not 
only to enable Durham boats to be towed through, but also 
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the gunboats which had been used to protect convoys of bateaux on the navigable stretches of the Saint Lawrence during the war, and small steam tugs which the Admiralty hoped would eventually be employed on the inland lakes and rivers of the Canadas.**" Gunboats, propelled by oars and sail, were up to sixty-four feet long, with a sixteen-foot breadth of beam, and a four-feet, nine-inch draught.40 The steam tugs in contemplation must have been somewhat larger for, by 1819, it was decided to construct the Lachine Canal with locks 108 feet long by twenty feet wide with up to five feet of water on the sills.4^ This scale of canal lock was thereafter adopted for the Grenville Canal already under construction.42 Where the Rideau waterway was con­cerned, no decision was taken as to the scale of canal to be constructed pending the completion of an Upper Canadian inquiry. 
In 1823-24, the legislature of Upper Canada employed a civil engineer, Samuel Clowes, to survey and report on the poten­tial cost and feasibility of constructing a number of canals in the province, including the proposed Rideau communica­tion. Clowes reported in September 1824 that the construc­tion of an uninterrupted canal from Kingston to the Ottawa River was possible by the Rideau Lake route; but a Durham boat canal, with a depth of five feet to enable the draught of these vessels to be increased, would cost £145,802.43 This sum ranged far beyond anything that had been contem­plated hitherto and, at this juncture, the Colonial Office, which had been assiduously promoting the settlement of the Rideau corridor while trying to induce the provincial legis­lature to undertake the construction of a canal, turned to consider another mode of transport which appeared potentially less costly to construct. 
In December 1824, James George, a forwarder on the Saint Lawrence, patented a novel method of constructing wooden portage railways44 and tried to form a company to undertake the improvement of the Saint Lawrence navigation. He in­tended to establish a sloop navigation between Montréal and Kingston by blasting rocks impeding the river channels, con­structing portage railways to carry laden sloops around im­passable rapids and employing steamboats to tow the vessels on the river and up through the deeper rapids where strong currents had hitherto prevented boats propelled by oar, pole or sail from ascending.45 When George submitted his invention to the Colonial Office, Lord Bathurst immediately seized upon the idea of completing the desired Rideau mili­tary communication by constructing a railway from the head of the Ottawa River navigation to Kingston.^6 At that time, the handful of English tramways in existence averaged about thirteen miles in length;47 but what Lord Bathurst had in contemplation was a railway of the unprecedented length of up to 125 miles making use of George's wooden railway or a more conventional track.4** 
According to George's specifications, the track of his rail­way was to be formed of grooved, rough-hewn logs with iron strapping on a gauge matching the carts and wagons in 
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common use, and on which cradles capable of carrying ves­
sels of varying hull dimensions were to be drawn. Horses 
were to provide the motive power on most of the system, 
but on steep inclines, a double track was to be constructed 
with a stationary steam engine positioned at the crest to 
operate an endless chain by which one cradle or wagon could 
ascend while another descended.49 George claimed that his 
railway could be constructed using materials and tools 
readily at hand for only £10 per mile which meant, if his 
cost calculations were correct,50 that a railway from the 
Ottawa River to Kingston would cost as little as £1,250 ex­
clusive of the operating equipment. 
Although George's projected railway was of a seemingly 
primitive nature, the materials to be employed in its con­
struction were by no means outmoded in terms of the state 
of advancement of North American railway building technol­
ogy. In England, Jessup's cast iron edge rail, in its two-
foot, six-inch lengths, had long since been the standard 
form of track which was only beginning to be superseded by 
the twenty-foot lengths of wrought iron rail that 
Birkenshaw, as of 1820, had succeeded in producing by 
rolling;51 but iron rails were unknown in North America. 
The several short tramways constructed in the United States 
prior to 1825 had solid wooden rails and, in the following 
year, a three-mile-long Boston tramway was the first in 
North America to use wooden rails capped with strips of 
flat iron.52 Solid iron rails were not to be introduced 
into American railway construction until 1835, and into 
Canadian railway construction until still a decade later.5^ 
In North America, around 1825, wooden rails with iron 
strapping were, if anything, advanced rather than an ar­
chaic form of railway construction and, likewise, George's 
proposal to use horsepower and stationary steam engines 
rather than steam traction was in keeping with the most re­
liable power system developed for railways to that date. 
In England, Richard Trevithick had employed a steam loco­
motive in hauling a ten-ton load over a colliery tramway 
as early as 1804,54 but subsequent efforts to employ steam 
locomotives on tramways had attained only a limited success 
marred by frequent breakdowns, steaming problems and an 
inadequate rail-making technology which severely limited 
their efficiency and effective range of operation.55 By 
the 1820s, English railway engineers were, for the most 
part, convinced that the employment of horsepower on long, 
level stretches of railways in conjunction with stationary 
steam engines on short, steep inclines — where hills could 
not be readily avoided — was the most efficient and reli­
able system of operating a railway.56 Indeed, by 1825, 
this had become the standard approach to the construction 
and operation of English railways.57 The steam locomotive 
was not able to establish a marked superiority over horse­
power until October 1829 when Robert Stephenson's Rock&t, 
equipped with the newly-developed multi-tubular boiler 
and an exhaust-induced draught, was able to draw a forty-
four ton load a total distance of seventy miles back and 
forth without difficulty.58 These decisive developments 
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James George's Original Drawing 
(Public Archives of Canada) 
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in the steam locomotive were, as yet, in the future when, 
in December 1824, the Colonial Office, and subsequently the 
Ordnance Department, had their first view of James George's 
portage railway scheme. At that time the horse-powered 
railways, employing stationary steam engines on steep 
gradients, were the most effective and efficient mode of 
railway transport in existence in England or anywhere. 
In response to Bathurst's railway suggestion, the Ordnance, 
in April 1825, appointed a commission of Royal Engineers to 
examine into the state of the defences of British North 
America and, in particular, to provide preliminary cost es­
timates for the canals and/or railways needed to render 
Upper Canada defensible.59 After reconnoitering the river 
systems of the Canadas, the Smyth Commission reported in 
September 1825 that uninterrupted canals, on a scale suf­
ficient to enable gunboats to circulate freely through the 
whole of the military transport system, were, from a mili­
tary standpoint, superior to railways. Canals were by far 
the most economical means of transport as one horse could 
draw twenty-five tons on a canal, but only five tons with 
ease on a railway, and in the Canadas canals could be used 
almost year round. In winter, once the ice hardened, sleds 
loaded with any bulk of weight could be readily drawn along 
their surface, whereas the operation of railways would 
be severely restricted, if not prevented altogether, by the 
severity of the climate and the heavy snowfall.**" This was 
a widely-held belief in the Canadas where, as in the Rideau 
corridor, winter temperatures could range as low as -32°F. 
for days on end and the snowfall could reach up to fifteen 
feet in near-record years.6 By contrast, the potential 
use of canals as a winter transport system was readily per­
ceived by the Smyth Commission as the transport of heavy 
bulk freight over the ice of winter 'river roads,' a 
Canadian tradition. In view of the suspected difficulty, 
if not impossibility, of operating railways during the long 
Canadian winter, the commissioners concluded that railways 
were not suited to serve as major transport arteries in the 
Canadas and that they should be employed only in situations 
where great weights had to be transported over very short 
distances in the absence of sufficient water to construct 
a canal.62 In their view, canals were also cheaper to con­
struct than railways. 
The Smyth Commission reported that whereas a canal four feet 
deep by twenty feet wide could be excavated for an expendi­
ture of £1,860 per mile, a railway would cost up to £3,000 
to construct. Moreover, a canal could step directly up 
steep slopes where sufficient water was available, but a 
railway could not be constructed for horse-drawn wagons 
with an angle of ascent greater than one degree, or a 
ninety-two feet rise in a mile. This meant that in hilly 
country a railway might well have to be routed over three 
times as great a distance as a canal. Taking this compara­
tive distance factor into account, the commission calculated 
that the extra distance a railway would have to be construc­
ted to overcome hilly terrain was roughly equal to the cost 
of constructing locks to overcome the same difference of 
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elevation on a direct line and, therefore, canals were £1,140 per mile cheaper to construct than railways based on a simple comparison of the cost of excavation versus that of building a railway.63 
Where railways and canals were concerned, the Smyth Commis­sion based its assessment of construction costs on contem­porary British experience. No report was made on the feasi­bility of James George's novel scheme for building railways nor were his cost calculations taken into account.64 The Smyth Commission, in calculating railway construction costs, did not even consider what had proven around 1825 to be the most efficient and cheapest mode of construction, viz. the building of railways on a direct line with approximately level gradients but making use of inclines equipped with stationary steam engines to ascend steep hills — thereby eliminating the need for constructing long detours. None­theless, based on the Smyth cost figures for laying tracks, even a direct railway over the 125-mile distance from the Ottawa River to Kingston would have cost £375,000, whereas Samuel Clowes had calculated that by taking advantage of the natural waterways of the Rideau corridor, a Durham boat canal, with locks fifteen feet by eighty-five feet and five feet of water on the sills, could be constructed for £145,802.65 In keeping with the above assessment, the Smyth Commission recommended that an uninterrupted canal with locks twenty feet by 108 feet to match the locks of the Lachine and Grenville canals should be constructed through the Rideau corridor at an estimated cost of £169,000,66 and in March 1826, Lieut.-Col. John By of the Royal Engineers was selected by the Board of Ordnance to superintend its construction.67 
Soon after arriving in Upper Canada, By became convinced that the Rideau Canal should be built with large locks, 150 feet by fifty feet with ten feet of water on the sills. He informed the Ordnance Department that if this were done, in conjunction with the enlargement of the Ottawa River locks and the new Lachine Canal, it would enable the largest of the steamboats then employed on the Saint Lawrence River be­low Montréal to circulate through to Lake Ontario and there­by provide a system of transport readily adaptable for mili­tary purposes in wartime. By believed that the whole system could be constructed for £1,200,000 or roughly double the total cost of operating the old Saint Lawrence transport system during the war, and that once built, an uninterrupted steamboat navigation would enable British forces to be mar­shalled in strength at any given point on the frontier with a rapidity of movement the Americans: could not match on land or on their barge canals.68 
It is not surprising that By should have been struck by the military potential of steamboats. In the Canadas, commer­cial steamboat runs had been introduced at a very early date commencing with John Molson's Accommodation, launched at Montreal in 1809 to provide a passenger service between that city and Québec.69 When By arrived in the Canadas, there were more than a dozen sidewheelers employed on the Great Lakes and lower Saint Lawrence River.7" The largest 
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class of these steamers was about 145 feet long and had an 
overall width of forty-eight feet with an eight-foot 
draught.71 
The Ordnance Department, although in agreement with By as 
to the immense commercial and military advantages to be 
gained by such a steamboat navigation, nonetheless turned 
his recommendation down on the grounds that steamboats 
would be unable to operate on canals, and that the towing 
of steamboats through an extensive canal system was of no 
real advantage. Moreover, the construction of the Rideau 
Canal with large locks would have little utility if the 
other canals were not similarly enlarged, and to construct 
locks of such a size through the whole system would entail 
enormous costs, probably far beyond what By had in contem­
plation.72 Leaving aside the question of cost, which dic­
tated heavily against By1s scheme, there was much to be said 
in favour of the Ordnance's decision based on the situation 
as it was perceived from England. Despite their unquestioned 
success on the rivers of the British Isles and North America, 
steamboats were not used on canals. In Great Britain, a 
number of experiments had been tried in operating steamboats 
on canals, but with very discouraging results. In every 
case the churning of the paddle wheels destroyed the banks, 
and experience had shown that the only effectual response 
was either to protect the banks by walling and/or paving — 
which was prohibitively expensive — or to eliminate the 
source of the problem. Hence, steamboats were banned from 
British canals.73 
In response to the arguments cited by the Board of Ordnance, 
Lieut.-Col. By pointed out that almost 100 miles of the 123-
mile-long Rideau waterway would consist of either broad 
lakes or wide rivers, the banks of which were scoured each 
spring by floods ranging as high as fifteen feet above the 
mean level of the river. The other river navigations be­
tween Québec and the Rideau were of a similar nature. On 
the whole of the 324 miles of waterway from Québec to the 
mouth of the Rideau, there would be only a few miles of 
canal by-passing the Lachine rapids and some twelve miles of 
canal passing around the Ottawa River rapids where steam­
boats would have to be towed. 
To overcome the objection of the Ordnance Department to the 
enormous cost of constructing a large lock steamboat navi­
gation from Québec through to Lake Ontario via the Rideau 
route, By changed his argument somewhat and argued that if 
the Rideau alone were built with the 150-by-fifty-foot lock 
at a reduced depth of five feet, it would still suffice to 
realize the major commercial and military advantages of a 
through steamboat navigation. Steamboats could be stationed 
on the long navigable stretches of the Saint Lawrence and 
Ottawa Rivers to tow Durham boats, which could also be 
towed by oxen through the existing Lachine Canal and the 
Ottawa locks without any need for transhipment. At the 
head of the Grenville Canal, the cargoes could be transhipped 
into the large lake steamboats which, if not fully laden, 
could pass through the whole of the Rideau system to Lake 
Ontario and beyond.74 By was convinced that on such a 
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system, the whole of the 447-mile voyage from Québec to Kingston could be covered in seventy-seven hours of steam­ing time, and the cost of transporting stores reduced from just over 4 per ton on the Saint Lawrence route to £l 1/3 per ton.75 These advantages could be realized for an addi­tional expenditure of as little as £50,000 for as long as the depth of the navigation remained the same, the amount of damning and embanking required to construct the Rideau Canal would not change appreciably nor would the thickness of the lock wall masonry estimated for the smaller scale of canal.7^ 
Once the survey work on the Rideau was completed, By repor­ted further that if steamboats were not used thereon, ves­sels would have to rely on oar or sail to effect a passage as towpaths were impracticable for up to seventy miles where the banks consisted of either high rocky cliffs — which would be too costly to excavate — or low-lying flood plains and swamps which would require heavy embanking at a prohibitive expense. Furthermore, on the Rideau the canal cuts were being carried for the most part through solid rock which would pose no problem in operating the paddles of steamboats.7' 
In view of the compelling nature of By1 s arguments, the Board of Ordnance decided to despatch a committee of Royal Engineers to Upper Canada to decide on the scale of lock to be built. The Kempt Committee reported in June 1828 that the critical consideration was the need.to secure a depen­dable means of propulsion for military transport vessels. Although sails and sweeps might well suffice for commercial transport needs where two paths could not be constructed, this was not the case for war operations. Vessels could not tack against the wind on a canalized river, and relying on oars or awaiting a favourable wind would occasion unaccep­table delays. Consequently, the committee concluded that the construction of locks of a sufficient size to enable steamboats to circulate through the Rideau Canal was impera­tive. The committee, however, did not see the advantage of constructing the large lock proposed by By without a pro-portionably deep canal and correspondingly large locks on the other canals, which would be prohibitively expensive. Accordingly, they decided that the Rideau navigation should be built five feet deep with locks sufficiently large to pass the smallest of the steam towboats that had proved capable of operating on the open waters of the Ottawa River navigation. These sidewheelers were 108 feet long and thirty feet wide across the paddleboxes, with a four-foot draught, and their thirty-two HP engine, it was calculated, could easily tow two fully-laden Durham boats at a speed of four to five miles per hour in quiet water. Moreover, the com­mittee noted there were more than enough Durham boats cur­rently in use on the Saint Lawrence to provide ample trans­port for military and naval stores in the event of war, and the Durham boats would be able to pass through the whole system from Montréal to Kingston independent of the Saint Lawrence without any recourse to transhipment.78 Subsequent­ly, the size of lock approved by the Kempt Committee — 134 feet by thirty-three feet — was built on the Rideau Canal 
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which, when it opened for navigation in May 1832, was^ the 
first steamboat canal in the Canadas, if not the first to 
be constructed anywhere.79 
In the decade-or-more-long quest to determine how an alter­
native communications system to that in existence on the 
Saint Lawrence might be best developed and operated in the 
interior of Upper Canada, the British Ordnance Department 
had concentrated on determining what was the best medium as 
well as mode of transport. Whether roads, canals or rail­
ways were considered, the inquiry focussed on each medium 
of transport in terms of its feasibility as well as its con­
struction and maintenance costs, carrying capacity, the 
availability of the motive power required and its relative 
speed and ease of operation. Initially, the Ordnance De­
partment had intended to develop a bateaux navigation by 
way of the Ottawa-Rideau route employing thereon the 
French-Canadian bateaux, the prevalent mode of river trans­
port on the Saint Lawrence; but when the American Durham 
boat came into common use on major Canadian rivers, the pos­
sibility of employing these vessels in the military trans­
port system was investigated. When it became apparent that 
a canal through the Rideau corridor would be much more cost­
ly to construct than hitherto suspected, the Ordnance De­
partment — at the prompting of the Colonial Department — 
immediately turned to investigate the possibility of a rail­
way. Although the subsequent inquiry focussed on the feasi­
bility of constructing a railway in keeping with English 
standards, rather than the as-yet unproven invention of 
James George, the Canadian invention did initiate the in­
quiry into the railway alternative and railways were ulti­
mately rejected in large part because of their perceived un-
suitability to the Canadian environment. 
Where a steamboat canal was concerned, the Ordnance was slow 
to respond to the benefits realized through the early intro­
duction of this mode of transport onto Canadian river navi­
gations. However, this rejection was based on the British 
experience where all but insuperable difficulties had been 
encountered in attempting to operate steamboats on canals. 
Once Lieut.-Colonel By made it clear that the same objec­
tions did not apply to a canal constructed on a canalized 
river system in the Canadian environment, where heavy spring 
floods scoured river banks, and in particular did not apply 
to the Rideau Canal where the canal cuts were being carried 
through the rock of the Canadian shield, the Ordnance quickly 
came to appreciate the advantage of employing this mode of 
transport on the Rideau Canal. At all stages of the inquiry 
into various possible solutions to the military transport 
problems encountered during the War of 1812, the alterna­
tives were assessed not only in terms of the British exper­
ience with which the Ordnance Department was directly famil­
iar, but also in the context of the Canadian setting. The 
British Ordnance Department showed itself to be acutely a-
ware of the problems posed by the Canadian climate and en­
vironment in determining what medium of transport should be 
utilized, and the latest developments in Canadian transport 
technology were taken into account in deciding what mode of 
transport was best suited to meet military transport needs 
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in the Canadas. 
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